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INTRODUCTION
Have you ever wondered if you are related to a famous historical
figure? With a genealogy analysis costing less than a night out on the
town, millions of people have swabbed their cheeks out of curiosity to
discover more about their heritage. Ranging in price from $69 to $200,
commercial DNA businesses analyze DNA samples and provide users
with detailed information about themselves and their family. Cool,
right? Think again. Suddenly, these customers have willingly exposed
their most private information—their living selves—to the entire world.
Without even realizing it, these customers have reduced their
expectation of privacy. The Fourth Amendment generally prohibits
491
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unreasonable searches and seizures. 1 However, information a person
shares with third parties can be freely accessed by the police. 2 Under
the “third-party doctrine,” police can obtain information from a third
party without a warrant, even though the person has not directly
disclosed the information to the police. 3 Thus, if you willingly share
information with others, you are willingly relinquishing your right to
privacy. 4
Modern technology inevitably clashes with outdated precedent,
creating the need to reevaluate the scope of the third-party doctrine.
This includes the type of information that the doctrine exempts from
Fourth Amendment protections. Does it matter with whom the
information is being shared? Do changes in modern social customs
require a new analysis of the third-party doctrine when it comes to
DNA? Primarily, police obtain DNA data from the Combined DNA
Index System (“CODIS”), a police database consisting of DNA
collected from lawful arrests and other stages of law enforcement. 5
However, as consumer websites like Ancestry.com continue to
accumulate mass amounts of DNA, police should be entitled to use
these databases as investigative aids. Police investigations can benefit
from using commercial DNA services to connect familial, or even
direct, DNA matches to solve crimes, but at what cost? Thus, the
critical legal and societal question is how to strike the appropriate
balance. New judicial rulings, which reduce the third-party doctrine’s
scope, open the door for the development of procedures to secure
sensitive information.
As digital communication expands, expectations of privacy
regarding all types of information are at odds with the archaic
application of both the third-party doctrine and the original concept of
the expectation of privacy. Applying these doctrines in the modern era
requires a new understanding of privacy. Preserving the intent of the
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. See infra Part I Section A.
3. See generally United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
4. Id.
5. See Natalie Ram, Fortuity and Forensic Familial Identification, 63 STAN. L.
REV. 751, 760–61 (2011) (“Pursuant to . . . legislation, the FBI pioneered the
Combined DNA Index System (CODIS)—a central database into which participating
states and agencies can ‘load’ the genetic profiles they lawfully acquire and search
among the profiles made available by other jurisdictions”).
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doctrines in the current decade will protect the people and ensure that
the government can access only what is warranted under modern
standards. This requires weighing the benefit of warrantless access to
DNA against the loss privacy rights. In our world of ubiquitous and
increasingly impersonal digital communications, it is time to reevaluate the pivotal role of the expectation of privacy.
This Comment will address how the third-party doctrine conflicts
with DNA privacy in light of the popularity of commercial DNA
websites geared to the public. Part I explains the premise of the thirdparty doctrine and provides examples where police incriminate suspects
based on DNA from websites, evidencing the investigatory latitude the
third-party doctrine provides to accessing publicly collected DNA. Part
II discusses how online privacy trends and the Supreme Court’s
Carpenter decision foreshadow the limits of the third-party doctrine.
Part III explains how a limited third-party doctrine could prevent
exploitation of privacy on DNA websites where users voluntarily
relinquish their most sensitive personal data. Part IV proposes solutions
to privacy issues resulting from police access to commercial DNA
databases under the third-party doctrine.
I. THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE APPLIED TO COMMERCIAL DNA
Online DNA testing companies offer a wide array of services and
are both vast in number and consumer popularity. There are dozens of
DNA testing companies across the Internet, and over twelve million
people have used one or more DNA companies to test their genetic
code. 6 DNA testing has become so popular that there is now even a
market for pet DNA kits. 7 The most well-known DNA testing
companies are Ancestry.com and 23andMe.com, but other popular
companies include MyHeritage.com, FamilyTreeDNA.com, and
LivingDNA.com. 8 As of 2017, there are 39 direct-to-consumer genetic

6. Antonio Regalado, 2017 Was the Year Consumer DNA Blew Up, MIT TECH.
REV. (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610233/2017-was-theyear-consumer-dna-testing-blew-up/.
7. See Eric Griffith, The Best Dog DNA Testing Kits for 2019, PC (Dec. 17,
2018), https://www.pcmag.com/roundup/364005/the-best-dog-dna-testing-kits.
8. See Mark Orwig, Best DNA Test for Ancestry, SMARTER HOBBY,
https://www.smarterhobby.com/genealogy/best-dna-test/ (last updated Mar. 2019).
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testing companies worldwide. 9 These companies offer a variety of
services, depending on the company’s method of testing and the
services purchased.
For instance, Ancestry.com offers users
information about their relatives and family tree, whereas
23andMe.com provides health-related information based on a person’s
genetic makeup. 10 Some websites are built on an open-sharing
platform, which allows users to directly compare their data with other
users, while other websites act in a closed universe setting and do not
share user data. 11
However, DNA databases pose civil and criminal privacy concerns
because DNA companies and government agencies may have access to
the user’s information. This raises the concern of tracking where the
information goes after a user participates in a DNA testing service. As
expected, the user has access to their DNA results, but unbeknownst to
most customers, consumer DNA companies often retain the contractual
rights to use the DNA results or information however they choose.12
These rights include giving user-provided DNA to medical studies and
selling the information to other third parties. 13 As consumer protection
lawyer Joel Winston said, “[i]t’s basically like you have no privacy,
they’re taking it all.” 14 For example, companies like Ancestry.com can
continue using the DNA even after the user’s death. 15

9. Sheldon Krimsky & David Cay Johnston, COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE
GENETICS, ANCESTRY DNA TESTING & PRIVACY: A CONSUMER Guide 2 (2017),
http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/img/Ancestry-DNA-Testing-and-Priv
acy-Guide.pdf.
10. See Orwig, supra note 8.
11. Id. (describing certain DNA websites allow users to contact matches, while
other websites are more restrictive).
12. See Kristen Brown, What DNA Testing Companies’ Terrifying Privacy
Policies Actually Mean, GIZMODO (Nov. 18, 2017, 10:10 AM), https://gizmodo
.com/what-dna-testing-companies-terrifying-privacy-policies-1819158337
(discussing how DNA testing websites have ownership rights to genetic information
users send them).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. (“Even though Ancestry says they don’t really own your DNA . . . they
[do] own rights to it. They could test it in 100 years from their freezer for whatever
purpose they want”).
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Further, sharing DNA with these businesses may diminish users’
right against warrantless searches and self-incrimination. 16 The thirdparty doctrine determines whether law enforcement can access this
information and what legal steps are required to access the data. 17 Since
the third-party doctrine permits warrantless searches of any information
given to third parties, and DNA websites are third parties, the thirdparty doctrine could technically give police complete access to
consumer DNA databases. 18 In fact, recent criminal cases shed light on
how the third-party doctrine presently and routinely enables police to
utilize consumer DNA databases, despite concerns about privacy and
law enforcement accuracy. 19
A. How the Third-Party Doctrine Was Born
The third-party doctrine is an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s
general prohibition against warrantless searches and seizures, and has
developed from a number of Supreme Court cases. 20 Under this
exception, any information a person relays to a third party is not
protected against warrantless searches. 21 The third-party doctrine,
which was established in the 1970s by Smith v. Maryland and United
States v. Miller, applies to any information someone voluntarily
discloses to a third party. 22 Both of these cases rely on the “expectation
16. See Glen Martin, Gird Your Genes: What DNA Matching Might Mean for
Your Privacy, CAL. MAG. (July 24, 2018), https://alumni.berkeley.edu/californiamagazine/just-in/2018-07-24/gird-your-genes-what-dna-matching-might-meanyour-privacy (explaining individuals who voluntary give their DNA to open-source
DNA platforms are effectively waiving their reasonable expectation to privacy).
17. Id.
18. See id. (“Uploading information to GEDmatch and similar sites involves
implicit consent: by using the site, you agree to surrender your information to the
public domain.”).
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); United States v. Miller,
425 U.S. 435 (1976).
21. See generally Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44 (holding there is no expectation of
privacy to phone numbers dialed on a phone where the phone numbers were
automatically disclosed to a third party upon placing a call); Miller, 425 U.S. at 449–
50 (holding defendant did not have an expectation of privacy to bank records
voluntarily made available to the public).
22. See generally Smith, 442 U.S. at 744; Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
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of privacy” standard from Katz v. United States to determine whether
the information gathered without a warrant constitutes an illegal
search. 23 In Katz, the violation of one’s “expectation of privacy”
became the standard to determine whether a search occurred,
eliminating the former physical trespass requirement. 24
In Miller, the government accessed a suspect’s bank records
without a warrant. 25 There was no expectation of privacy for the bank
records because they were not confidential communications. 26 Rather,
the defendant voluntarily revealed the information to the bank, a third
party. 27 The Court held that police can access such information “even
if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only
for a limited purpose.” 28 Following Miller, the Court’s holding in Smith
expanded the third-party doctrine to encompass phones. 29 This case
reinforced that voluntary conveyances of information to a third party,
here a phone company, erodes an individual’s expectation of privacy. 30
Even though the defendant believed this was private information, the
Court concluded that the defendant “assumed the risk” the phone
company could reveal the information to others, including the police.31
As a result, the warrantless access to the information was permitted. 32
In an attempt to find balance between privacy in the digital age and
police investigation tactics, the Court has analyzed reasonable
expectations of privacy in a variety of different technologies. A notable
application of the expectation of privacy occurred in United States v.
23. Smith, 442 U.S. at 742–44 (1979); Miller, 425 U.S. at 442.
24. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (holding “the ‘trespass’
doctrine . . . can no longer be regarded as controlling” when evaluating whether a
search has taken place).
25. Miller, 425 U.S. at 436.
26. Id. at 442 (“[C]hecks are not confidential communications but negotiable
instruments to be used in commercial transactions”).
27. Id. (finding a person should not expect privacy when handing information
to a third-party).
28. Id. at 443.
29. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979).
30. Id. at 744.
31. Id. (concluding defendant “voluntarily conveyed numerical information to
the telephone company and . . . [i]n so doing . . . assumed the risk that the company
would reveal to police the numbers he dialed”).
32. Id. at 745–46.
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Jones, which is the first of a handful of cases to define appropriate
means of information gathering in light of technological advancements.
In Jones, the police followed the defendant’s car for over twenty-eight
days using a GPS tracker that police surreptitiously installed onto the
car. 33 This long period of surveillance abused the basic principle that
police could follow a person on public roads. 34 In a split opinion, the
Court decided that the extensive tracking constituted an impermissible
warrantless search, but the divided court did not agree on a unified
rationale. 35
Maintaining privacy has become a societal concern as the
prevalence of social media increases. The third-party doctrine, which
was first developed in the 1970s, “turned heavily on the limited forms
of interaction in a prior technological era.” 36 However, as social media
use has increased, a tweet about what you had for breakfast can be
instantly viewed by thousands of people you may or may not directly
know. Social media, text messaging, online shopping, and other
services allow the average American to share a significant amount of
information with others daily. 37 Through the current application of the
third-party doctrine, police and other governmental agencies can easily
access this information without legal constraint. As one article notes,
“Communications, commerce, and finance increasingly take place
online and operate through private intermediaries; accordingly, the
third party doctrine has left an immense amount of personal information
unprotected by the Fourth Amendment.” 38 The lack of legal safeguards
for accessing personal information online, extends to previously
inaccessible genetic information. Although the availability of personal
data, including genetic information, can improve police investigations,
there are concerns about over-extending government control and
eroding the Fourth Amendment. 39

33. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 403 (2012).
34. Id. at 412.
35. Id. at 411–13.
36. Lucas Isaacharoff & Kyle Wirschba, Restoring Reason to the Third Party
Doctrine, 100 MINN. L. REV. 987, 987–88 (2016).
37. See id. (discussing the limits of the third-party doctrine in the digital age).
38. Id. at 988.
39. Id.
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B. The Third-Party Doctrine and DNA: Recent Cases Solved by DNA
Historically, most public concern with the dissemination of DNA
website data involved its use in civil claims, specifically insurance
disclosures and employment discrimination. 40 However, commercial
DNA databases have recently been used in criminal cases. Under the
third-party doctrine, police can use DNA websites in criminal
investigations without needing to get a warrant. 41 Commercial DNA
websites and other companies that analyze DNA are enhancing
investigations and narrowing down suspect lists. The ability to
compare DNA samples from website users, which were intended for
fun and entertainment, could potentially lead to police turning
commercial databases into a secondary CODIS system. Two recent
cases that have used commercial DNA to identify suspects are the
Golden State Killer case and the April Tinsley murderer. Each case
remained unsolved until new DNA advancements narrowed down the
suspect list. These cases reveal how new DNA technology has the
potential to not only solve current crimes, but to go back in time and
bring closure to cold cases.
1. The Golden State Killer Controversy
The Golden State Killer is a well-known California murder case,
which had gone unsolved for over forty years, until DNA websites came
into the picture. 42 The Golden State Killer murdered twelve people,
raped forty-five others, and committed over 100 home burglaries over
a ten-year span. 43 The killer was never caught, and the case turned cold.
A break in the case finally arrived when someone uploaded their DNA

40. Eric Rosenbaum, 5 Biggest Risks of Sharing Your DNA With Consumer
Genetic-testing Companies, CNBC (June 16, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.cnbc
.com/amp/2018/06/16/5-biggest-risks-of-sharing-dna-with-consumer-genetictesting-companies.html?__twitter_impression=true.
41. Bradley Henry, Third-Party Doctrine: What Is It and Why Does it Matter?,
HENRY L. (June 21, 2016), www.henrylawny.com/third-party-doctrine-matter/.
42. See Bruce Brown, DNA Link to Golden State Killer Raises Questions of
Privacy Versus Safety, FOX NEWS (Apr. 30, 2018), http://www.foxnews.com/tech
/2018/04/30/dna-link-to-golden-state-killer-raises-questions-privacy-versus-safety.ht
ml.
43. Id.
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to GEDMatch.com. 44 GEDMatch.com is an “open source,” platform,
and the users are warned by the company that their information may be
“accessed for uses other than ancestry searches.” 45 Using the DNA
database from this website, police found a positive familial match from
a consumer’s DNA sample and DNA found at one of the crime scenes
from the Golden State Killer. 46 This DNA match allowed police to
track Joseph DeAngelo, the alleged Golden State Killer. 47 DeAngelo
is now on trial for the crimes perpetrated by the Golden State Killer.48
The success of the Golden State Killer case has sparked a movement to
find other killers, such as the Doodler and the infamous Zodiac Killer,
using consumer DNA databases. 49
2. April Tinsley and DNA Facial Sketches
Just a few weeks after the news broke about the commercial DNA
used to identify the alleged Golden State Killer, police used DNA
services to track down April Tinsley’s murderer. 50 April Tinsley was
an eight-year-old girl from Indiana who was abducted, raped, and killed
in 1988. 51 Tinsley’s killer was never caught despite leaving an
abundance of DNA behind. 52 More disturbingly, Tinsley’s murderer
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Sam Gross, Alleged Golden State Killer Makes Second Appearance in
Court; Set to Return May 29, RENO GAZETTE J. (May 14, 2018, 1:10 PM),
https://www.rgj.com/story/news/crime/2018/05/14/golden-state-killers-trial-delayeduntil-may-29/608581002/; see also Amelia McDonell-Parry, What’s Next for Alleged
Golden State Killer, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 24, 2018, 2:16 PM), https://www.rolling
stone.com/culture/culture-news/golden-state-killer-joseph-deangelo-whats-next-715
368/ (noting the case is ongoing and does not have a final ruling yet).
49. See, e.g., Nick Watt, This Serial Murder Case Has Been Cold for More Than
40 Years. Now Police Say They Have a Suspect, CNN (June 21, 2018, 5:32 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/20/us/doodler-cold-case-murders/index.html
(discussing the importance of DNA in solving crimes such as the Doodler murders).
50. Eric Levenson & Amanda Watts, Child-Killer Taunted Investigators for 30
Years With Disturbing Notes. DNA Ends the Mystery of Who Did it, Police Say, CNN
(July 17, 2018, 6:52 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/16/us/cold-case-apriltinsley-dna-trnd/index.html.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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left sickening notes threatening to kill more young girls in the area.53
Even though the police had the suspect’s DNA, they could not match it
with the databases available at the time. 54
After news outlets detailed the arrest of the Golden State Killer, the
investigators of Tinsley’s case decided to give DNA identification
another shot and sent their crime scene sample to Parabon Nanolabs.55
Parabon Nanolabs uses DNA samples from other commercial DNA
companies like Ancestry.com and GEDmatch.com to make a possible
facial image of the unknown match. 56 Unlike the Golden State Killer
case, which primarily relied on matching the murderer’s DNA with a
relative, Parabon Nanolabs used the crime scene samples from
Tinsley’s murder to create a possible sketch of her killer. 57 This facial
information narrowed the suspect pool to two people – the Miller
brothers, John and JPM. Police collected DNA samples from John
Miller’s trash, which positively matched the 1988 sample. 58 A month
later, John Miller confessed to killing Ashley Tinsley. 59 Using the
Parabon Nanolabs facial creation software, police were able to
successfully arrest John Miller, the dangerous man who threatened to
strike again in 1990 and 2004. 60
3. What These Cases Mean for Future DNA Use
Commercial DNA services, like Ancestry.com, aid law
enforcement in two ways. First, these websites can provide a direct
match or familial match that law enforcement can use to catch
criminals, like the Golden State Killer. Second, other companies, such
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Kate Snow & Jon Schuppe, ‘This is Just the Beginning’: Using DNA and
Genealogy to Crack Years-old Cases, NBC NEWS (July 18, 2018, 1:30 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/just-beginning-using-dna-genealogy-crack
-years-old-cold-cases-n892126.
57. Id.
58. Gina Martinez, DNA Match Leads to Arrest in 1988 Rape and Murder of
Indiana Girl After Decades of Taunts from Killer, TIME (July 16, 2018),
http://time.com/5339649/april-tinsley-indiana-murder-john-d-miller/.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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as Parabon Nanolabs (“Parabon”) and Identitias, can use these
programs and databases to create sketches of suspects. 61 Founded in
2008, Parabon is a genetics company that recently expanded its
application to criminal investigations. 62 Parabon offers a service called
Snapshot. 63 Snapshot is a phenotyping program that uses known DNA
samples to generate a composite facial image based on similarities
between the unknown sample and Parabon’s DNA database. 64 These
facial images can be used by law enforcement to aid criminal
investigations.
With the ease and availability of obtaining user DNA data,
consumer DNA websites have the alarming potential to broaden the
CODIS database to a greater scope than just the actual users.
Commercial DNA websites can add exponentially more information
because they can extrapolate information not just about the person who
used the website but also the person’s relatives. The ability to connect
individuals through their DNA is the purpose of services such as
Ancestry.com, which are specifically designed to connect people to
their family. 65 As a result, each individual DNA sample as well as each
familial related match is added to the police’s search range, drastically
increasing the data pool size. When cross referenced with commercial
DNA data, one DNA sample can point police to a whole family tree, as
shown by the Golden State Killer case. The police can not only gain
physical access to twelve million individual DNA samples, but they
also get the second cousin twice removed through a familial related
match. 66
Beyond direct familial connections, DNA technology reaches
greater heights through genetic phenotyping. The individual, the
61. See Parabon Snapshot Advanced DNA Analysis, SNAPSHOT DNA
ANALYSIS, https://snapshot.parabon-nanolabs.com/ (last visited May 1, 2019).
62. About Parabon Nanolabs, PARABON NANOLABS, https://www.parabonnanolabs.com/nanolabs/about (last visited May 1, 2019).
63. Kate Snow, Putting a Face to DNA: How New Tech Gives Hope in Cold
Cases, NBC NEWS (June 30, 2015, 4:47 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/usnews/dna-mugshot-how-new-tech-gives-hope-cold-cases-n384771.
64. Id.
65. See ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com/cs/ancestry-family (last visited
May 1, 2019) (noting to users of the site the “more you grow your family tree, the
more hints you’ll get [to related family members]—a loop of discoveries”).
66. Regalado, supra note 6.
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second cousin, and any unknown matches with similar coding can be
deduced.
Phenotyping is a relatively new method of DNA
identification but it is rapidly growing and being used in police
investigations. 67 Rather than relying on a direct match or familial
match, this genetic technology can sketch the person based on other
similar DNA already collected by these companies. 68 Such technology
provides more potential samples to compare to police-obtained
evidence and could double the amount of information police can access.
Currently, the CODIS system holds thirteen million samples.69
CODIS data is commonly used in criminal investigations. Potentially,
every time police collect evidence from a crime scene, they can use
CODIS to see if there is a match. Similarly, with genetic phenotyping,
every additional sample from DNA websites improves the algorithm
that predicts facial features of unidentified suspects whose DNA is not
already in CODIS. These databases are now as large as the CODIS
database, but the standards used to collect and analyze this information
are not government regulated. 70 Although the Department of Defense
has funded Parabon phenotyping research, standardization is not
currently required. 71 With the abundance of easily accessible
67. See Snow, supra note 63 (observing Parabon’s ability to use DNA left at
crime scenes to produce sketches of suspects).
68. Id. “[Parabon] created a reference database of genomic data and the outward
physical traits typically associated with those genes. Now, with each new sample, a
mathematical model helps predict which traits that person has, based on their genetic
code.” Id.
69. CODIS – NDIS Statistics, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis/ndis-statistics (last
visited May 1, 2019).
70. See Regalado, supra note 6 (noting consumer data collecting websites often
function frequently with little oversight from regulators).
71. See Parabon Awarded Government Contract to Develop Next-Generation
Forensic DNA Platform, PARABON NANOLABS (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.parabon
-nanolabs.com/nanolabs/news-events/2016/11/keystone-next-generation-dna-forensi
c-platform-award.html (discussing Parabon’s contract with the Department of
Defense, which will eventually include implementing “the latest forensic DNA
analysis tools under a single, easy-to-use platform”). Parabon Nanolabs has another
contract with the Department of Defense to help identify unidentified military remains
from past wars. Parabon Awarded U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Contract to
Aid Identification of Unknown Remains from Past Conflicts, PARABON NANOLABS
(Jan. 27, 2016), https://www.parabon-nanolabs.com/nanolabs/news-events/2016/01/
snapshot-afdil-contract-award.html.
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information, abuse of these consumer DNA databases is along the
horizon, although not many cases have come to light.
So far, police have not asked Ancestry.com directly for DNA
information, 72 but the question is, will Ancestry have to hand over that
information when the police come knocking on their door? Presently,
Ancestry.com’s Privacy Statement requires a valid warrant to disclose
DNA information. 73 While this is nice contractual protocol, it falls
short because technically police do not need a warrant for information
voluntarily given pursuant to the third-party doctrine. In theory, police
could force these websites to hand information over. In the alternative,
officers can upload a sample they collected at a crime scene, enter the
information into a commercial DNA website, like Ancestry.com, and
use the service like any other consumer.
Even if Ancestry.com and other commercial DNA websites do not
share their DNA information with law enforcement, phenotyping
businesses can offer police the same information, if not more. Parabon,
for instance, gathers DNA samples from both Ancestry.com and
GEDMatch.com to fuel its Snapshot program. 74 In turn, Snapshot is
promoted to law enforcement as a new innovative tool to fight crime.75
Through this service, Parabon utilizes private DNA information
originally entrusted to sites like Ancestry.com. Parabon gathers
information from “public genetic genealogy” sources, 76 raising
concerns about how the third-party doctrine applies to this context.
Although Parabon may technically rely on public genetic genealogy
sources, consumers are not aware of this information exchange. What
once started out as a simple consumer-to-company interaction,
transforms into a multi-layered exchange of information. Thus, the
72. Ancestry 2017 Transparency Report, ANCESTRY, http://www.ancestry.com/
cs/transparency (last visited May 1, 2019).
73. Your Privacy, ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/privacy
statement (last visited May 1, 2019) (noting to users if Ancestry is forced to disclosure
personal information, it will provide “advance notice, unless . . . prohibited under the
law from doing so”).
74. Snapshot Genetic Genealogy, PARABON NANOLABS, https://snapshot.para
bon-nanolabs.com/genealogy (last visited May 1, 2019).
75. See Parabon Snapshot Advanced DNA Analysis, PARABON NANOLABS,
https://snapshot.parabon-nanolabs.com/ (last visited May 1, 2019) (highlighting the
genetic technology used by law enforcement to identify the Golden State Killer).
76. Id.
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privacy rights within the Ancestry.com and GEDMatch.com contracts
might not be enough to protect consumers from other companies
working with law enforcement. Just because consumers give up their
DNA voluntarily to commercial websites, police should not be
permitted to access the information by virtue of the information being
“public.”
According to Dr. Thomas May, a professor at Washington State
University, “[o]ur current regulatory approach to privacy in direct-toconsumer (DTC) genealogy testing has permitted the creation of a Wild
West environment.” 77 Dr. May believes this regulation-free “Wild
West environment” enabled the government to acquire the DNA
leading to the arrest of Golden State Killer, Joseph DeAngelo.78
Although consumer DNA websites have standard privacy policies,
anyone, including law enforcement, can get around these privacy
policies simply by purchasing a DNA kit and uploading a sample into
the database as a user. The officers pursuing the Golden State Killer
did not even have to get a warrant to find DeAngelo. 79 Instead, the
officers simply uploaded the sample they had from the crime scenes
into a commercial database to see if there was a match. 80
II. SETTING THE PATH FOR HEIGHTENED PRIVACY PROTECTIONS
A. The Modern Expectation of Privacy
Consumers are concerned about the actual amount of privacy in
digital services they use. Many people are attempting to take control of
their privacy by going through measures online to “remove or mask
their digital footprints.” 81 However, according to the Pew Research
Center, out of the 86% of people taking preemptive measures to
maintain privacy, over 61% feel they can do more to secure their
77. Thomas May, Sociogenetic Risks – Ancestry DNA Testing, Third-Party
Identity, and Protection of Privacy, 2018 NEW ENGLAND MED. J. 410, 411 (2018).
78. Id.
79. Brown, supra note 42.
80. Id.
81. Lee Raine, The State of Privacy in Post-Snowden America, PEW RES. CTR.
(Sept. 21, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/21/the-state-ofprivacy-in-america/ (finding around “86% of users have taken steps online to remove
or mask their digital footprints”).
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information. 82 Further, one survey showed that people view certain
types of “public” information, such as email contents, as more invasive
than pat downs or vehicle searches. 83 Consumers are concerned about
who controls their information, who can collect their information, and
where the information can be shared. 84 States are responding to this
mass cry for privacy. 85 Recent developments in state law suggest a shift
away from the original interpretation of “expectation of privacy.” For
instance, California has passed numerous digital privacy laws to
increase digital security over the past few years. 86 California legislation
strengthens online privacy on an array of digital forums by regulating
online tracking, social media, and other personal online information. 87
In the social media sphere of privacy, Facebook has reacted to the
heightened expectation of privacy by modifying its privacy settings.88
These changes were a result of users choosing to opt out of Facebook’s
services all together because of their digital privacy concerns. 89 In
82. Id.
83. Isaacharoff & Wirschba, supra note 36, at 995 n.54; see also Lee, supra note
81 (stating that 74% of the study found it ‘very important’ to have control over who
gets their information, and 65% found it “‘very important’ to . . . control what
information is collected about them”).
84. Isaacharoff & Wirschba, supra note 36, at 995.
85. See Hannah K. Speirs et al., Notable New State Privacy and Data Security
Laws—Part Two, S&W CYBERSECURITY & DATA PRIVACY L. BLOG (Feb. 20, 2017),
www.swlaw.com/blog/data-security/2017/02/20/notable-new-state-privacy-and-data
-security-laws-part-two/ (detailing state-level privacy reforms affecting education,
data privacy, and business law).
86. See, e.g., Education Foundation, Recent Online Privacy Legislation in
California, CONSUMER FED. OF CAL., https://consumercal.org/about-cfc/cfceducation-foundation/recent-online-privacy-legislation-in-california/ (last updated
Feb. 19, 2016) (“California expanded its existing Student Online Personal Information
Protection Act and its limits on operators’ uses of student information to apply to
preschool and prekindergarten students”).
87. See generally id. (detailing recent privacy legislation in California from
2013 to 2015).
88. See Yuki Noguchi, Facebook Changing Privacy Controls as Criticism
Escalates, NPR (Mar. 28, 2018, 12:08 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2018/03/28/597587830/criticism-prompts-facebook-to-change-privacy-controls
(explaining Facebook implemented changes in its privacy setting “after coming under
intense public and regulatory pressure for unauthorized disclosures of private
information to a third-party firm”).
89. Id.
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response, Facebook is making it easier for customers to change their
privacy preferences. 90 Facebook’s goal is to help reduce targeted
advertisements, which use personal data. 91 These changes show that
the “reasonable expectation of privacy” – the legal boundary between
what is searchable and what is not – is expanding. Now, consumers are
demanding to keep more areas private, even within the generally public
forum of social media.
B. Carpenter v. United States: Judicially Limiting the Third-Party
Doctrine
The recent trend of vigilantly protecting privacy rights is reflected
in the 2018 United States Supreme Court decision, Carpenter v. United
States. 92 This case examined whether police can conduct warrantless
searches and seizures of cell phone records. 93 The Court in Carpenter
held that the third-party doctrine does not extend to sensitive location
data recorded by cell phone towers. 94 Traditionally, police were
allowed to access phone records because they were considered public. 95
However, the Court decided in a narrow 5-4 decision that police need a
warrant to search cell phone location data for extended periods of
time. 96 The Court found that gathering the cell phone data is a search
and requires a warrant due to the invasive location information stored. 97

90. Id.
91. See id. (noting Facebook’s privacy policy changes enable users to block the
dissemination of their personal information to third-party advertisers).
92. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
93. Id. at 2211.
94. Id. at 2217.
95. Id.
96. See Curt Levey, Supreme Court Ruling in Cell Phone Case is a Victory for
our Privacy Rights, FOX NEWS (June 22, 2018), http://www.foxnews.com
opinion/2018/06/22/supreme-court-ruling-in-cell-phone-case-is-victory-for-our-priv
acy-rights.html; see also Amy Howe, Opinion Analysis: Court Holds that Police Will
Generally Need a Warrant for Cellphone Location Information (Updated), SCOTUS
BLOG (June 22, 2018, 6:01 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/opinion-ana
lysis-court-holds-that-police-will-generally-need-a-warrant-for-cellphone-locationinformation/ (noting the extended period of time could mean any time greater than
seven days).
97. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
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The defendant, Timothy Carpenter, was convicted of robbing
multiple Radio Shacks with three other people. 98 Instead of getting a
warrant, the police applied for a court order under the Stored
Communications Act (“STA”). 99 The STA requires a lower standard
than probable cause to compel a third-party to disclose information. 100
Using months of cellular-based location records (over 127 days), the
police discovered the exact location of both Mr. Carpenter and his codefendant. 101 The appellate court determined that since the defendant
voluntarily gave his information to the cell phone provider, he had a
lesser expectation of privacy and was not entitled to Fourth Amendment
protection. 102 The Supreme Court disagreed. Instead, the Court
acknowledged the issues that high-tech information gathering systems
present in light of the third-party doctrine. Expectations of privacy have
transformed due to the drastic technological advancements since Miller
and Smith were decided. When “Smith was decided in 1979, few could
have imagined a society in which a phone goes wherever its owner
goes.” 103 If communication devices that could fit in your pocket were
hardly imaginable in 1979, sending DNA to a website to analyze your
genetic code was unfathomable. 104 DNA did not debut in criminal
investigations until 1986, more than a decade after Miller; therefore, the
98. Id. at 2212.
99. Id. The Stored Communications Act allows the “Government to compel
disclosure of certain telecommunications records when it ‘offers specific and
articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe’ that the records
sought ‘are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.’” Id.
100. See id. at 2221 (concluding a showing of “reasonable grounds” that the
information sought is relevant to the investigation “falls well show of the probable
cause required for a warrant”).
101. Jennifer Lynch, Symposium: Will the Fourth Amendment Protect 21stCentury Data? The Court Confronts the Third-Party Doctrine, SCOTUS BLOG (Aug.
2, 2017, 12:21 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/08/symposium-will-fourthamendment-protect-21st-century-data-court-confronts-third-party-doctrine/.
102. Id.; see also Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213.
103. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
104. Scientists are just beginning to analyze DNA. Two years before the thirdparty doctrine was created, scientists were only in the developmental stage of
implementing sequencing techniques – years away from analyzing DNA like today.
The Human Genome Project began roughly 20 years after the third-party doctrine was
already in effect and was not completed until years later. See The History of DNA
Timeline, DNA WORLDWIDE, https://www.dna-worldwide.com/resource/160/historydna-timeline (last visited May 1, 2019).
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third-party doctrine could not have been intended to extend to such
sensitive matters. 105
Another key underpinning of the Court’s conclusion in Carpenter
is how the “expectation of privacy” is defined in Katz. 106 Back in 1967,
the Katz Court defined the expectation of privacy as “one that society
is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” 107 This “expectation of
privacy” is the backbone of the third-party doctrine, which is based
upon the expectation of privacy that arises when information is
voluntarily shared. 108 Now, according to Carpenter, “[t]here is a world
of difference between the limited types of personal information
addressed in Smith and Miller and the exhaustive chronicle of location
information casually collected by wireless carriers.” 109 In the context
of today’s hand-held device society, the Carpenter court found it was
reasonable for the defendants to expect their locations over long periods
of time to be private. 110 The “fact that the information is held by a third
party does not by itself overcome the user’s claim to the Fourth
Amendment protection.” 111 The government argued the third-party
doctrine applies to cellular tracking information, 112 but the Court
rejected the government’s argument as a “significant extension” of the
third-party doctrine to a new era of information. 113 The expectation of
privacy afforded to cellular data was reasonable, and the Court decided

105. See Lisa CalandroDennis & J. ReederKaren Cormier, Evolution of DNA
Evidence for Crime Solving – A Judicial and Legislative History, FORENSIC MAG.
(Jan. 1, 2016, 3:00 AM), https://www.forensicmag.com/article/2005/01/evolutiondna-evidence-crime-solving-judicial-and-legislative-history (discussing the first time
genetic evidence was admitted into court was in 1986 from expert witness, and
molecular biologist, Alec Jeffreys).
106. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (holding the Fourth
Amendment “protects people, not places” therefore, “[w]hat a person knowingly
exposes to the public” is not protected).
107. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
108. Id.; see also United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
109. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018).
110. Id. at 2218.
111. Id. at 2217.
112. Id. at 2218.
113. Id. at 2219.
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there was no reduced expectation permitting police to access this data
without a warrant. 114
For now, the complete scope and application of Carpenter remains
unknown. The Court asserted that its holding only applies to the
collection of location-based data from cell towers. 115 The Court also
opinioned its holding does “not disturb the application of Smith and
Miller or call into question conventional surveillance techniques and
tools, such as security cameras.” 116 However, the line between
“conventional” techniques and techniques like location-surveillance is
muddled. As technology advances and more invasive surveillance
techniques become “conventional,” Carpenter’s narrow scope will be
tested. Future technology may qualify as “location-based,” even
though it may not directly provide location information. Paul Ohm, a
law professor and information privacy expert, predicts that Carpenter
will be extended to other investigatory tools. Ohm explains, “[t]he true
test of the substantive sweep of Carpenter will be whether courts apply
its reasoning to government access to databases full of sensitive and
intimate information” that does not necessarily involve location
information. 117 Focusing on the sensitive nature of information rather
than whether it is location-based would expand Carpenter’s scope–
specifically, to commercial DNA information.
III. REEVALUATING THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE’S APPLICATION TO
DNA FROM COMMERCIAL DATABASES
It is nearly impossible to function in this modern era of digital
communication without sharing a great deal of information with third
parties. Third-party services control most aspects of modern life, like
communication, finances, school, and the internet, and it is an
impractical and unattainable task for an individual to live without
sharing private information. Miller and Smith come from a time-period
where voluntary relinquishments of personal information were a
significant departure from the norm. In the 1970s, most people kept
114. Id. at 2221.
115. Id. at 2222.
116. Id. at 2220.
117. Paul Ohm, The Broad Reach of Carpenter v. United States, JUST SECURITY
(June 27, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/58520/broad-reach-carpenter-v-unitedstates/.
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their private information private. Now, basically everything the
average person does exposes their information under the traditional
third-party doctrine. This should lead the judicial system to reexamine
whether “voluntariness” and “awareness” of privacy relinquishment are
related.
The traditional application of the third-party doctrine was logical a
few decades ago, when it was not necessary to share information on
such a wide-scale level to participate in society. Back then, it was
presumed that when information was given away, the person sharing
the information was aware their privacy was lessened. However,
people today understand their privacy in terms of privacy settings and
policies associated with Facebook and other social media and apps.
Although social media users still desire privacy from government
intrusion, Pew reported that nearly 70 percent of users do not trust that
social media sites will keep their information secure. 118 In a different
survey, 80 percent of law enforcement officials reported using social
media to further investigations. 119 Although the legal implications of
sharing information remain the same, people’s understanding of their
privacy rights has significantly changed. Most Americans are
extremely concerned with keeping their digital information private and
controlling how their information is shared. 120 According to the Pew
Research Center, 91% of adults believe consumers have no control over
how their information is used and transmitted by companies. 121 If
people are this concerned about protecting their Facebook “likes” and
Twitter posts, then the concept of protecting DNA information should
be even more important.
Although the Carpenter opinion does not expressly mention DNA,
DNA and cell phone data are both private sources of information that
118. Mary Madden & Lee Raine, Americans’ Attitudes About Privacy, Security,
and Surveillance, PEW RES. CTR. (May 20, 2015), www.pewinternet.org/2015/
05/20/americans-attitudes-about-privacy-security-and-surveillance/.
119. TheBestVPN LTD., Can the Police Use Facebook to Investigate Crimes,
GOV’T TECH. (Mar. 5, 2017), www.govtech.com/public-safety/can-the-police-usefacebook-to-investigate-crimes.html.
120. Lee Raine, The State of Privacy in Post-Snowden America, PEW RES. CTR.
(Sept. 21, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/21/the-state-ofprivacy-in-america/.
121. Id. (“Fully 91% of adults agree or strongly agree that consumers have lost
control of how personal information is collected and used by companies”).
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deserve ample protection under the Fourth Amendment. The main
difference between the third-party presence in cell phone location and
DNA information is the level of voluntary relinquishment. Sharing
information with cell phone providers is required to use a cell phone,
and cell phones are an essential technology. Further, the average cell
phone user is unaware that cell phone towers constantly track their
location. However, when it comes to DNA services, the user knowingly
decides to purchase an optional service where they opt to provide their
genetic information. The third-party doctrine’s rationale is better
served when there are realistic opportunities to choose whether to share
information. However, in situations where there is no choice, people
are backed into a corner. Cell phones are an examples of this because
“when the Government tracks the location of a cell phone it achieves
near perfect surveillance, as if it had attached an ankle monitor to the
phone’s user.” 122 As a result, consumers are left unprotected from
third-party providers’ data use, because user agreements are illunderstood and terms are included in contracts that most users do not
read.
Another distinction between Carpenter and DNA databases rests
on the type of information being exposed. Carpenter analyzes physical
location information, 123 whereas DNA does not reveal location data on
its own. DNA may reveal information about the organic makeup of an
individual, but unlike cell phone location data, DNA will not notify the
police if an individual is present in a certain state. However, DNA has
the potential to enhance location technology. For example, if police
investigate a person’s DNA through a Snapshot and rely on the facial
sketch to search street camera footage, the DNA would help pinpoint a
person’s location.
This reflects how DNA information and
conventional surveillance technologies can be used in tandem to gather
information previously not available. As these technologies begin to
merge, it will eventually become arbitrary to define different types of
technology under the law.
Currently, DNA services are not as integral to police investigations
as cell phone providers, but they still contain highly sensitive
information. As such, the ideology behind Carpenter should extend to

122. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018).
123. Id. at 2217.
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sensitive information like DNA. 124 Genetic information is significantly
more sensitive than location-based data provided by cell towers and
should require more invasive procedures to access. Regardless of
whether DNA data is given knowingly or voluntarily, DNA contains
intimate information and functions as a physical map to the human
body. The Supreme Court recognizes the sensitive nature of cell phone
location data; therefore, this rationale should be extended to other
equally or more sensitive information, such as DNA. The third-party
doctrine has already been challenged with high level privacy concerns.
Therefore, the issues presented in the Carpenter case confirm the thirdparty doctrine has overstretched its intended bounds in the digital age.
As Justice Sotomayor has previously declared, “the third-party doctrine
is ill suited to the digital age.” 125
The Carpenter court acknowledged that cell phone tracking devices
are continuing to evolve in “depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach”
and the protections of the Fourth Amendment should not be diluted in
light of these continued technological advancements. 126 This idea is
paralleled with the advancement of DNA use. From individual matches
to phenotyping, the versatility of DNA is on the edge of a revolution.
The use of DNA data will continue to become even more accurate a few
years from now. Although improvements are generally seen as a
positive direction, DNA technology is improving at the cost of privacy.
Permitting companies to share private information without the user’s
complete knowledge, via the third-party doctrine, allows companies to
aggregate a larger database. In turn, the government is accessing these
databases without the need for a warrant.
The evolution of case law in this area exemplifies how the
expectation of privacy in the Katz case has influenced and transformed
privacy law over time. Since advances in technology make it easier to
invade privacy, courts have responded in ways to preserve the intent of
the Fourth Amendment. 127 The Court’s rationale in Katz introduced the

124. See Levey, supra note 96 (finding that “[r]apid technological change
inevitably outpaces the glacial evolution of the law and the Carpenter case is a perfect
example”).
125. Lynch, supra note 101.
126. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223.
127. See generally Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014) (ruling on the
application of the Fourth Amendment to cell phones); see also Kyllo v. United States,
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general principle that police cannot conduct searches that violate a
reasonable expectation of privacy. 128 However, in the decades to
follow, police started using new technology to get the same information
that was once unavailable because it required a search. Then, in 2001,
the Court in Kyllo prohibited law enforcement from using senseenhancing technology to gather information that would otherwise
require a physical search to prevent police circumventing searches with
technology. 129 This exemplifies how technological advancements can
threaten core Fourth Amendment protections. The third-party doctrine
needs to account for the sensitive nature of DNA and limit police access
to commercial DNA databases by refining its application, just as the
Supreme Court in Kyllo refined Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to
prevent abuse of new technologies.
The Court’s rationale in Kyllo and Carpenter highlights the need
for change as technology continues to create new privacy concerns.
When technology begins to supersede the controlling law, the law must
adapt. Privacy law has adapted to technological advancements
before. 130 An established legal principle, present in a completely new
and different era from which it was created, requires readjustment to
restore balance. Matching the intent of the law with modern ideals is
like a pendulum, swinging one way then the opposite until it lands
balanced in the middle. The third-party doctrine was created in a time
where precise tracking technology was unimaginable. As recently as
2012, “society’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and
others would not–and indeed, in the main, simply could not secretly
monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for
a very long period.” 131 The precision of current technology requires a
narrowing of the third-party doctrine.

533 U.S. 27 (2001) (ruling on the application of the Fourth Amendment to thermal
imaging devices and other “sense-enhancing” technology).
128. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
129. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
130. See, e.g., Riley, 573 U.S. at 385; see also Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
131. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
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IV. THE FUTURE OF DNA PRIVACY
Access to DNA databases enhances police investigatory tactics by
increasing the number of available samples to test against evidence.
The DNA data from commercial DNA websites can be used to
incriminate users, and police have an easier time accessing this data
because of the public’s interest in finding out about their heritage
through DNA testing. With more samples, police could potentially
track down more criminals, and increase safety, through direct matches,
familial matches, and predicted facial sketches. Proponents of these
investigatory methods believe that reduced privacy is a justified
sacrifice for protection against crime. But just how far will this tradeoff
go? Dr. Thomas May, professor at Washington State University, warns
that without laws to make DNA companies more uniform in privacy
protections, the customers will inadvertently pay the price. 132
. . . regulatory oversight is needed to ensure the privacy of genetic
information, determine who should be allowed to submit someone
else’s sample for testing and for what purposes, and guide the
drawing of inferences from DNA results and the relaying of
information to persons other than the DNA source who may be
implicated by those results — but may be unaware that testing
relevant to them has even occurred.133

Finding a balance between the benefits DNA websites offer while
maintaining some level of individual control over privacy is a solution
legislation can provide. According to Senator Charles Schumer, an avid
proponent of increasing DNA privacy, consumers are unaware of the
underlying rights they give up when signing up for commercial DNA
services. 134 Senator Schumer speaks about the dangers unregulated
DNA companies pose to privacy, insurance, and employment.135
Regulating these companies, requiring more transparency about where
the user’s information is going, and permitting the users to consent to
132. May, supra note 77, at 412.
133. Id.
134. Shari Logan & Linda Massarella, Schumer Warns DNA-home Tests Could
be Gathering Personal Info, NY POST, https://nypost.com/2017/11/26/schumerwarns-dna-home-tests-could-be-gathering-personal-info/ (last updated Nov. 26,
2017, 4:03 PM).
135. Id.
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specific dissemination channels, could provide users with more privacy
control. Regulations and transparency are feasible options and many
major DNA companies have already modified their privacy statements.
These commercial DNA companies are reacting to the public distrust
of DNA privacy stemming from the assortment of cases like the Golden
State Killer and April Tinsley appearing in mainstream media.136
However, permitting DNA companies to modify their privacy
statements without oversight will lead to inconsistencies in the scope of
privacy protection and disclosure. These uneven privacy protections
negatively impact consumers, who are not likely capable of
understanding the minute differences between the different policy
statements to make an educated decision between multiple commercial
DNA website options. Instead, consumers might decide which DNA
service to purchase based on cost, the testing they want, and other
personal preferences. Commercial DNA businesses have demonstrated
a willingness to change to protect their customers. However, this
change needs to be regulated to ensure customers are evenly protected.
Actions have been set in motion to evaluate the privacy protections
in the consumer DNA industry. In 2017, Senator Schumer spoke out
about the lack of consumer awareness and rights in the DNA industry:
When it comes to protecting consumers’ privacy from at-home DNA
test kit services, the federal government is behind. Besides, putting
your most personal genetic information in the hands of third parties
for their exclusive use raises a lot of concerns, from the potential for
discrimination by employers all the way to health insurance. 137

In 2018, prompted by Senator Schumer’s public endorsement of the
issue, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) began investigating
136. Since the start of this article, Ancestry.com and other websites have
updated their policy statements to include more sections to clarify the privacy rights.
See, e.g., Your Privacy, supra note 73.
137. Press Releases, Schumer Reveals: Popular at Home DNA Test Kits are
Putting Consumer Privacy at Great Risk, as DNA Firms Could Sell your Most
Personal Info & Genetic Data to All-Comers; Senator Pushes Feds to Investigate &
Ensure Fair Privacy Standards for all DNA Kits, CHARLES E. SCHUMER (Nov. 26,
2017), https://www.schumer.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/schumer-revealspopular-at-home-dna-test-kits-are-putting-consumer-privacy-at-great-risk-as-dnafirms-could-sell-your-most-personal-info-and-genetic-data-to-all-comers-senatorpushes-feds-to-investigate_ensure-fair-privacy-standards-for-all-dna-kits.
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Ancestry.com, 23andMe.com, and other DNA companies to determine
if their methods are appropriate. 138 The FTC will determine whether
the companies have privacy standards that obtain the full consent of
their customers. 139 According to privacy attorney Joel Winston, if the
companies are not providing enough disclosure to customers, the “FTC
would be expected to prohibit the company form using, sharing, or
selling any such DNA data in its possession.” 140
An enforcement action by the FTC would send a clear message
that for-profit companies cannot use the fine print to quietly take an
ownership interest in their customers’ DNA. Companies must not be
permitted to mislead, deceive, or confuse customers about how their
DNA data is being collected, analyzed, and monetized. Reacting to
Senator Schumer, Leslie Fair, a Senior Attorney for the FTC’s Bureau
of Consumer Protection, warns that these companies’ “out-of-the-box
defaults” are not very private, and consumers should take an active
role in selecting the specific privacy settings they wish to have. 141
Currently, there are a few laws indirectly protecting genetic
privacy. The most recognized law is the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act (“GINA”), which was passed in 2008. 142 GINA
is designed to protect against civil discrimination in both insurance and
employment. 143 Privacy professor Dr. May is optimistic that future

138. Marcus Baram, The FTC is Investigating DNA Firms like 23andMe and
Ancestry over Privacy, FAST COMPANY (June 5, 2018), https://www.fastcompany
.com/40580364/the-ftc-is-investigating-dna-firms-like-23andme-and-ancestry-overprivacy.
139. See id. (noting The FTC is investigating “policies for handling personal
info and genetic data, and how they share that info with third parties”). “If the FTC
finds that any DNA testing company has failed to obtain the full, informed consent of
its customers, then the FTC would be expected to prohibit the company” from
accessing this type of information. Id.
140. Id.
141. Chris Brook, FTC Investigating how DNA Testing Firms Protect User
Data, DIGITAL GUARDIAN (June 11, 2018), https://digitalguardian.com/blog/ftcinvestigating-how-dna-testing-firms-protect-user-data.
142. Genetic Information Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/genetic.cfm (last visited May 1,
2019).
143. Id.
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legislation will enhance the protections that GINA provides. 144 “GINA
is a statement by our society that we recognize something’s needed –
we don’t approve of the use of these materials in this way.” 145 Dr. May
does not believe that GINA is enough to protect people on all sides of
the DNA discussion. 146 GINA mainly focuses on civil issues and leaves
the burden of proof on the injured party. Dr. May believes that although
GINA does not afford significant protections, it shows that society
recognizes a need for protection. 147 The mere fact that GINA exists
shows that citizens are concerned with protecting their DNA privacy.
The Carpenter decision, which requires warrants to obtain cellular
location information, is one step towards protecting privacy. The
judicial system should continue expanding upon this modern
interpretation of “expectation of privacy,” as it relates to various digital
technologies. Applying the Carpenter principle will enhance DNA
protection and privacy by preventing this type of information from
being accessed without a warrant under the third-party doctrine. The
Court in Carpenter narrowly decided to exclude cell tower locationbased data from the third-party doctrine’s scope. Although this case
specifically exempted location-based technology, the same principle
should be extended to commercial DNA websites. Some scholars view
the holding in Carpenter as foreshadowing the eventual eradication of
the third-party doctrine. 148 “With Carpenter, the third-party is almost
dead.” 149 Although the Carpenter decision carved out a narrow
exception to the third-party doctrine, privacy expert Paul Ohm
comments that the ruling is not technology specific. 150 Rather, the
Supreme Court focused on the nature of the information. Applying this
framework, Carpenter could apply to other “information that can locate
people.” 151

144. Telephone Interview with Dr. Thomas May, Professor, Wash. State Univ.
(Aug. 2, 2018).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Ohm, supra note 117.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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CONCLUSION
DNA is a piece of information dancing on the line between
commercial entertainment and medical information. Before these
websites existed, visiting a doctor was the only way to access DNA
information. The medical field has significant protections in place to
keep information safe, but the same cannot be said for these commercial
DNA websites. Police should be required to obtain a warrant when
seeking DNA from a third-party database. Although this might impair
police investigations, it is the price to pay to ensure some level of
privacy at the microscopic level. A warrant requires a showing of
probable cause, which ensures privacy is not invaded without a
legitimate concern for public safety. The Carpenter ruling has opened
the door for courts to experiment and create broader exceptions to the
third-party doctrine. Over the next decade, different types of
technology will test the limits of the third-party doctrine. As a result,
the third-party doctrine may become obsolete in our digital age.
Regardless of how future courts apply Carpenter, “the police should
think twice before trying to collect . . . [information] without a
warrant.” 152
Modification of the third-party doctrine is pivotal to the privacy
rights consumers have over their DNA. The rise in commercial DNA
websites for recreational purposes challenges the privacy expectations
usually associated with one’s living organic code. A person shares their
sensitive DNA information as soon as they swab their cheek and send
their DNA to Ancestry.com or other websites. This technology has the
potential to improve and contribute to public safety. However, until
such accuracy and privacy can be assured, there are great concerns
about DNA databases. “[I]t’s easy to say that if things represent threats
to privacy we shouldn’t allow them. I think that’s a little too rash, as
there’s a lot of good that comes from that testing as well.”153
Legislation that balances the benefits of this technology, while fostering
awareness and privacy, will enable shared genetic information to be
productive and protective. “What we need is experts in privacy

152. Id.
153. Telephone Interview with Dr. Thomas May, supra note 144.
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technology, geneticists, and law to get together to arrive at a
solution.” 154
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